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To Whom Does the Government Lawyer
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When
Clients Are in Conflict?
WILLIAM JOSEPHSON*
RUSSELL PEARCE**
INTRODUCTION
Government lawyers, like private lawyers, face conflicts of inter-
ests. This article will examine one kind of conflict which appears to
occur frequently but has received little scholarly attention. What is
the government lawyer's duty when there are conflicts between his
public officer or public agency clients?
A recent and illustrative example of such a conflict occurred dur-
ing New York City's 1975 fiscal crisis. The City of New York was on
the brink of bankruptcy.' The New York State and City employee
pension funds were the only remaining potential source of financing
over which the State or City governments had any control.2 Legisla-
* Member of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson; General Counsel, Peace Corps
1961-66; U. Chicago A.B. 1952; Columbia University J.D. 1955; Oxford University 1958-59.
** Staff Attorney, Civil Division, The Legal Aid Society of New York, former law clerk toThe Honorable Jos6 A. Cabranes, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut,
Yale University B.A. 1978, J.D. 1981.
We are especially grateful to Beverly Ross Campbell, Esq. for her valuable insights and
editorial guidance.
We thank Felicia Buebel, Esq., Mark Diller, Esq., and Gregory Poe for their research assist-
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Trustees' Pursuit of Social Goals, 24 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 43, 76-79 (1983).
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1. See Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119,
1119; C. MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE LIBERAL
EXPERIMENT 1960-1975, 232-36 (1980); K. AULETTA, THE STREETS WERE PAVED WITH
GOLD 273-74 (1979).
2. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Only
when [the trustees] were convinced that the pension funds were the lenders of last resort did they
authorize the investment in City bonds"), affd mere., 592 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); see also C.
MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE LIBERAL EXPERIMENT
1960-1975, at 232-36 (1980).
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tion mandating State and City pension systems to purchase City and
Municipal Assistance Corporation obligations had been held contrary
to the State Constitution.' During the ensuing negotiations between
the City and its employee pension funds concerning their purchase of
City and Municipal Assistance Corporation obligations, representa-
tives of the City's Law Department maintained that they were the
proper and sole legal counsel of both the pension funds and the City.4
Under the current ethical codes a private lawyer cannot, without
disclosure and consent, represent both the seller and the buyer in most
transactions, especially not in a sale of securities, a purchase where
issues of disclosure and due diligence abound.5 Why then would the
representative of the largest municipal law office in the country take a
contrary view?
This situation is not unusual. As the Committee on the Office of
the Attorney General of the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral offered:
When legal services are consolidated under the Attorney Gen-
eral, conflicts in representation may develop. One type of conflict
occurs when two agencies which the Attorney General represents
are on opposite sides of a legal argument. Another type of conflict
occurs when the Attorney General represents both a state board
and an agency appearing before it. An example would be a state
agency charged with violation of a civil service regulation appearing
before a civil service board. A third type of potential conflict would
be when the Attorney General intervenes in an action before a
board or commission for which he also serves as counsel. An exam-
ple would be an Attorney General intervening on behalf of the pub-
lic in a rate hearing before a public service commission. A conflict
could also develop if an Attorney General appears before a board of
which he is a member. Finally, the Attorney General could be the
defendant in an action brought before a board for which he provides
legal representation. For example, the Attorney General could be
the object of an employee complaint brought before a civil service
3. Scaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337 N.E.2d 592, 375 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
4. Telephone Conversation of December 4, 1975 between The Honorable W. Bernard
Richland, Corporation Counsel of The City of New York, and William Josephson, Esq., counsel
to employee organization trustee of New York City Employees' Retirement System.
5. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105; ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7; cf NAr'L ASS'N OF BOND LAWYERS COMMIT-
TEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, The Function and Professional Responsibilities of Bond
Counsel, 16 URB. LAW. 489, 492-93, 495, 499 (1984).
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commission which he represents. 6
When confronted by conflicting governmental authorities,7 gov-
ernment lawyers have adopted one of two approaches. Government
lawyers may follow the traditional legal ethics rules that a lawyer
should avoid conflicts. On the other hand, government lawyers may
assert that, sometimes on the basis of statutory authority or their rep-
resentation of the people or both, they must act without regard to the
conflict.'
This article examines the bases for these two approaches, the first
of which we call the ethical approach and the other the public interest
approach. We argue that government lawyers are subject to the same
ethical rules on conflicts of interest as are private lawyers. Indeed, not
only as an ethical matter but also as a policy matter, we conclude that
only this result is consistent with our republican and pluralistic system
of independent sources of government authority and our adversarial
system of dispute resolution.
I. THE ETHICAL APPROACH TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
That a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests has long been
a basic ethical principle of the American legal profession. 9 The com-
ment to the most recently promulgated code of legal ethics states,
"Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
6. NAT'L ASS'N OF Avr'ys GEN. COMM. ON OFFICE OF ATr'Y GEN., Powers, Duties and
Operations of Attorneys General, 171-72, 33-36 (1977) [hereinafter Powers of Attorneys General].
7. Much has been written about other conflicts government lawyers may face. See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV, L. REV. 1244,
1413-46 (1981) [hereinafter Developments]. This article will not examine conflicts in representing
both private individuals and governments, between the attorney's public and personal interests,
id. at 1422-26, or conflicts faced by a former government attorney, e.g., Civiletti, Disqualifying
Former Government Lawyers, 7 Lit. 8 (1981); Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957).
8. But see Weinstein & Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government
Attorneys and Clients, I Touro L. Rev. 1, 9 n.31 (1985), where the authors criticize the dichot-
omy between the ethical and public interest approaches based on an earlier draft of this article.
The authors, in a context which is different than that explored in depth here, suggest that no
dichotomy exists. The numerous cases and commentators cited herein amply demonstrate the
existence of at least two quite different approaches to conflicts facing a government lawyer.
9. G. SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PRO-
FESSION OF THE LAW 50 (Philadelphia 1854) (comparing "[tihe criminal and disgraceful offence
of taking fees of two adversaries" to parricide), cited in Developments, supra note 7, at 1247.
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client." 1
This principle, as embodied in Canon 5 of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, is in effect, with minor modification, in 45 states
and the District of Columbia to govern the conduct of attorneys."1
Canon 5 states that "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Profes-
sional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."' 2 To enforce this proscrip-
tion, the Code provides disciplinary rules which require a lawyer to
decline or refuse to continue employment "if it would be likely to in-
volve him in representing differing interests"'" unless "It is obvious
that he can adequately represent the interest of each [client] and if
each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of each."' 4 Only when both conditions-
that the representation obviously can be adequate and the clients give
consent-are satisfied is a lawyer permitted to represent clients with
differing interests.
Nothing in the Code indicates that its rules do not apply with full
force to lawyers who are public officers. Indeed, that Ethical Consid-
eration 7-14 of the Code discusses the duties of government lawyers in
litigation implies that the Code applies to government lawyers. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1983, explicitly apply to government
10. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
11. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code in 1969. Wright, The Code of
Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1970). Over the next
ten years, the courts and legislatures of all fifty states and the District of Columbia adopted the
Model Code with minor variations. In 1977, the ABA appointed a commission to evaluate the
Model Code. The Commission proposed the adoption of a new codification of the ethical guide-
lines--the Model Rules of Professional Conduct-which were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1983. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 01:101. Subse-
quently, five states have repealed the Model Code and adopted the Model Rules. ABA/BNA
Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct Current Reports 855 (1985). See 1984 Spec. Pamphlet
Ariz. Rules of the Supreme Court, Rules of Professional Conduct; Supplementary Pamphlet to
1985 Minnesota Rules of Court 27 et seq. (West); 1984 N.J. Sess. L. Service No. 4 A-77 et seq.
(West). Missouri and Montana have also adopted the Model Rules. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Man-
ual on Professional Conduct Current Reports, supra at 855.
12. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANNON 5 (1979).
13. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 5-105(A) (1979).
14. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 5-105(C) (1979). The
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT adopt, in essence, these requirements, Rule
1.7, and make clear that, even where the clients consent, the lawyer must determine that the
representation cannot reasonably be viewed to affect any of the differing interests.
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lawyers.' 5 The Preamble to the Rules supports this conclusion. It
states that the Rules do not abrogate constitutional, statutory or com-
mon-law authority for a government lawyer "to represent several gov-
ernment agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in
circumstances where a private lawyer cannot represent multiple pri-
vate clients." The implication is that absent such specific authority,
the conflicts provisions of the Rules, which are substantially similar to
those of the Code, make no exception for government lawyers. In-
deed, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in adopting the Model Rules,
amended the ABA rules regarding conflicts to state that a government
agency, unlike a private litigant, could never consent to representation
by an attorney representing differing interests.16
Courts and committees of professional ethics of bar associations
have applied the form or the substance of the conflicts provisions of
Canon 5 of the Code or the prior Canon 19 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics to prohibit representation of differing interests in a
number of situations where states or municipalities have interests sep-
arate and distinct from those of their constituent agencies.1" In
Krahmer v. McClafferty,t5 for example, members of the Wilmington,
Delaware City Council sought appointment of independent counsel.
They were defendants in an action where plaintiff sought mandamus
to require the City Council to amend specific appropriation ordinances
pursuant to an opinion of the City Solicitor, a mayoral appointee. The
City Solicitor offered to represent the City Council and opposed ap-
pointment of independent counsel paid from municipal funds on the
ground that the City Charter required the City Solicitor to represent
"the City and every officer, department, board or commission in all
15. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983) (com-
ment discusses application to government lawyers of provisions relating to representation of or-
ganizations). The National Association of Attorneys General attempted to exempt government
lawyers from the Model Rules governing conflicts of interests. This attempt was rejected by the
American Bar Association. See note 86, infra.
16. 1984 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. No. 4A-77, A88-A90 (West).
17. See People ex re. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. 478, 624 P.2d 1206 (1981). The
California Supreme Court not only applied Canon 5 but explicitly rejected the Attorney Gen-
eral's argument that because he is the protector of the public interest he is not bound by the
ethical rules that control the conduct of other attorneys in the state, specifically citing Rule 5-
102. But see Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission,
174 Conn. 308, 387 A.2d 533 (1978), discussed infra at note 92.
18. Kramer v. McClafferty, 282 A.2d 631 (Del. Super. 1971).
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litigation." 9
The court held for the City Council. It noted that "[t]he City
Solicitor not only owes a duty to the executive branch but has already
taken a public position contending that appropriations involved are
illegal. Neither he nor any member of his staff can represent the oppo-
site viewpoint without a conflict of interest."'2 The City Charter pro-
vision providing that the City Solicitor represent city entities in all
litigation did not insulate the City Solicitorfrom his ethical obligations
as an attorney. The court found that "[t]he duty and obligation of a
lawyer under the Canon of Professional Ethics supersedes any require-
ment of a City Charter such as we have here which would seem to
require that he or a member or his staff represent even though there
might be a conflict of interest involved."'"
A number of other courts have found or suggested that a govern-
ment lawyer should not represent conflicting governmental authori-
ties, without express reference to the ethical rules.22 In Motor Club of
19. Id. at 632.
20. Id. at 633.
21. Ia The same approach was adopted in Judson v. City of Niagara Falls, 140 App. Div.
62, 66, 124 N.Y.S. 282, 285 (1910). The Common Council appointed a committee of its members
to investigate a conflict between the City's police department and office of police justice. The
committee did not retain the City's Corporation Counsel because he had been acting as counsel
to the Mayor who was also President of the Police Board. Instead, the Council retained an
independent attorney. After the investigation, the City refused to pay the committee's independ-
ent counsel, and he sued for compensation. In defending the suit, the City argued that statutory
provisions making the Corporation Counsel the Common Council's attorney forbade the Council
from employing another attorney. The court rejected the City's argument. It noted that "[i]f the
[C]orporation [C]ounsel had attempted to discharge in this investigation all of the duties with
which in the event he appeared as [C]orporation [C]ounsel he would have been charged by the
charter, he would necessarily have occupied the anomalous position of appearing as the legal
adviser of each of the two antagonistic departments, whose conduct was to be investigated, and
also of the committee which was making the investigation[.]" Id. at 66-67. The law could not be
contemplated to require the Corporation Counsel to act "under circumstances which should in
no event be required of any honest and self-respecting attorney." Id. at 66. Accordingly, the
court construed the relevant statute to imply that the "Common Council had the authority to
employ independent counsel where a conflict of interest disqualified the Corporation Counsel
from acting." See also Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920-923 (W. Va. 1982) (applying
provisions of Code governing representation of client to require Attorney General to represent
Secretary of State even where he disagrees with that official's position); Caruso v. New York City
Police Dep't Pension Funds, 122 Misc.2d 576, 583, 470 N.Y.S.2d 963, 967 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983).
22. See Santa Rita Mining Co. v. Dep't of Property Valuation, Ill Ariz. 368, 530 P.2d 360
(1975) (rejecting appeal by attorney general to which state agency did not consent); Arizona
State Land Dep't v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1960) (refusing to permit attorney
general to challenge agency action); Wagand v. City of Nampa, 64 Idaho 432, 133 P.2d 738
(1943) (finding authority for government entity to retain independent counsel); Fish v. City of
Dearborn, 351 Mich. 169, 88 N.W.2d 450 (Mich. 1958) (same); Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin, 62
(Vol. 29
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Iowa v. Department of Transportation," plaintiff Motor Club obtained
a judgment declaring invalid a rule of the State Department of Trans-
portation and the Department appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.24
The Department then decided to abandon the appeal, but the Attor-
ney General refused on the ground that he controlled the litigation
pursuant to his general authority to represent the interests of the
State.2" The Court rejected the Attorney General's argument and dis-
missed the appeal. It observed that:
An attorney general should not seek to perform his duty to repre-
sent a department of state government where the goals of the de-
partment conflict with what the attorney general believes is the state
interest. State officers and state departments of government deserve
adequate legal representation. No representation can be adequate
unless it is without conflicts on the part of counsel.
2 6
The Court also noted a danger inherent in the Attorney General's
position:
To accord the attorney general the power he claims would leave all
N.Y.2d 260, 465 N.E.2d 314, 476 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1984). Calm v. Town of Huntington, 29
N.Y.2d 451, 328 N.Y.S.2d 672, 278 N.E.2d 908 (1972); Fleischmann v. Graves, 235 N.Y. 84, 138
N.E. 745 (1923) (same); Slominski v. Rutkowski, 91 A.D.2d 202, 458 N.Y.S.2d 757 (4th Dep't
1983), modified on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d 781,465 N.E.2d 56, 477 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1984); Buck
v. City of New York, 214 App. Div. 629, 212 N.Y.S. 310 (lst Dep't 1925); Hanna v. Rewkowski,
81 Misc. 2d 498, 365 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964) (same); Zablow v. Incorpo-
rated Village of Freeport, 41 Misc. 2d 803, 246 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1964) (same); State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372 (1919) (denying
Attorney General's motion to strike answer filed by state agency without consulting Attorney
General); Teleco, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n, 649 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1982) (denying attorney
permission to intervene in opposition to state agency but suggesting such intervention might be
allowed where the public interest was unrepresented and the agency could be represented by
independent counsel); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Kusic, 299 A.2d 53 (Pa. Comm'n Ct.
1973) (quashing appeal by Attorney General without consent of state agency party to action);
City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972) (denying
Attorney General permission to intervene against state agency); Providence Gas Co. v. Burke,
419 A.2d 263 (R.I. 1980) (acknowledging right of agency to retain private counsel in conflict
situation but also recognizing prerogative of Attorney General to determine which position to
represent); Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd., 568 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that
Attorney General could not oppose agency he was charged with representing); City of Tukwila v.
Todd, 17 Wash. App. 401, 563 P.2d 223 (1977) (finding authority for government entity to retain
independent counsel); Cathey v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Wis.2d. 184 130 N.W.2d 777 (1964)
(rejecting appeal by Attorney General to which agency did not consent); 10 McQuillin on Mu-
nicipal Corporations § 29.12 (Rev. ed. 1981) ("Contracts for outside legal services are sometimes
sustained where [the city attorney] represents . . . adverse interests .... ).
23. Motor Club v. Department of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1977).
24. Id. at 513.
25. Id. at 513-514.
26. Id. at 515.
19861
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branches and agencies of government deprived of access to the court
except by his grace and with his consent. In a most fundamental
sense such departments and agencies would thereby exist and ulti-
mately function only through him. . . We believe and hold the
attorney general possesses no such dominion or power.
27
In addition, several bar association ethical committees have
opined, citing Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility or its antecedents, that where the relationship between a
governing body and one of its agencies has become antagonistic, coun-
sel fully independent of the government should be retained for the
agency,2 8 perhaps even in the absence of any statutory authorization
for appointment of special counsel.2 9 Indeed, the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
opined that, notwithstanding a municipal charter provision establish-
ing the office of municipal attorney as the legal representative of the
municipality and all its departments and officials, when a true conflict
exists there is:
no way that, consistent with the Model Code [of Professional Re-
sponsibility], these opposing positions can be properly advocated in
the same litigation by members of the same law department, who
work from the same office and who are responsible to and presuma-
bly subject to the supervision and direction of the same department
head.3 0
27. Id. But see Feeney v. Commission, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977) and other
cases discussed at and following note 96, infra. A recent case takes the point made by the court
in the text quoted above, a step further. In Board of Trustees v. Detroit, 143 Mich. App. 651,
655, 373 N.W.2d 173, 175, motion for leave to appeal, (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1985), the Detroit Police-
men and Firemen Retirement System sued the City for past contributions. The Detroit Corpora-
tion Counsel contended that only he could appoint counsel to the Board of Trustees. The court
rejected this argument, citing Disciplinary Rules 5-105 and 5-107, "Defendants should not be
allowed to choose their own opposing counsel." Accord Caruso v. New York City Police Depart-
ment Pension Funds, 122 Misc. 2d 576, 470 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1983).
28. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1282 (1973)
(holding that no attorney in a corporation counsel's office may undertake to represent either side
or both sides in a suit which was brought by a city against its police force seeking reimbursement
in regard to the settlement of a suit filed against the city); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n., Comm'n on
Professional Ethics, Op. 447 (1976).
29. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1282 (1973). But
cf. Powers of Attorneys General, supra note 6, at 172. Neither of the two cases cited in the latter
authority appears to stand for the proposition, and one may actually support the ABA Commit-
tee position by calling for the appointment of a special attorney general. See also Secretary v.
Att'y Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 165 n.8, 326 N.E.2d 334, 339 n.8 (1975) (see also dissenting opinion
passim).
30. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1433 (1978). But
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The Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar As-
sociation has stated that "[w]hen a governmental body is organized
into a number of separate departments or agencies, such department
or agency, and not the parent governmental unit, should be treated as
the client for purposes of the rule which forbids the concurrent repre-
sentation of one client against another."'"
The ABA Ethics Committee has even held that where the munici-
pality's law department is privy to relevant confidences of the agency
or its employees as well as the municipality, due to its statutory status
as counsel for both, the law department may not represent either the
municipality or the agency when their interests come into conflict.32
Under the Rules and the Code, clients may in some circumstances
consent to dual representation, but in other circumstances a lawyer
may not act even if the client consents.33 Doubt has also been cast on
the efficacy of a public agency or a government consenting to dual
representation.34
Attorneys general have recognized the duty of government attor-
neys to obey the conflict rules. According to the Attorney General of
New York State, where a conflict exists between the position in litiga-
tion of a town justice and a town, the town attorney should represent
the town, and the town should provide private counsel to the town
justice. The Attorney General concluded that the town attorney was
"ethically bound to decline to participate" on behalf of the client other
see Commission on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Information Comm'n, 174 Conn.
308, 387 A.2d 533 (1978), discussed at note 92, infra.
31. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 501 (1979).
32. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1282 (1973).
33. As noted above, the New Jersey rules forbid a government agency from consenting to
multiple representation. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 1433 (1978) (mu-
nicipality and agency cannot consent to dual representation by municipal attorney) and N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 143 (1970) (a municipal attorney may not
represent private clients in matters before administrative agencies of the municipality even if the
municipality purports to consent to such representation); and 62 Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. 546 (1979)
with Ass'n of Bar of City of N.Y. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 894 (1978)
(city may consent to representation by private lawyers acting pro bono on city's behalf and simul-
taneously representing, in different matters, clients with interests adverse to the city) and City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio), aft'd, 573 F.2d 1310
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). New Jersey has precluded such consent. See
supra note 16. Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 218 (1979); Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1976); cf
Menella v. Office of Court Adm'n, 125 Misc.2d 63, 477 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1984).
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than the municipality. 3" In such situations the duty of the law depart-
ment to the "preeminent authority" of the municipality itself will pre-
clude the department from representing the officer or agency rather
than the municipality.36 The result appears to reflect the majority
view of attorneys general who responded to a survey published in
1977. Most of them viewed themselves as representing the state
agency most concerned, assuming it was acting within the law, regard-
less of the attorney general's own policy position.37 In cases of "real
conflict" retention of independent counsel appeared to be the favored
solution.
Surprisingly, the literature on government lawyers includes few
examples of commentators directly applying the legal ethics conflicts
analysis to conflicts between government authorities. For instance,
The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York and former
County Attorney for Nassau County, New York, delivered a speech
on Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney
which was later published as an article in the Maine Law Review.38
The article includes a specific subsection on "Conflicts of interest
among clients."39 Nowhere does it mention legal ethical rules. Wein-
stein instead relies on basic fairness to reach a result that approximates
the ethical approach:
There are instances where the position of one of the departments is
completely contrary to the position that the attorney feels is legally
defensible. In such cases the county attorney should, I believe, rep-
resent the side he considers to be correct. Special independent
counsel should be provided to represent the other side. Such an
appointment was made by Chief Justice Stone when he was Attor-
ney General of the United States; he himself argued against the spe-
cial counsel.4°
Weinstein also observed that "in part because I felt more comfortable
35. Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 211, 212 (1974).
36. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 501 (1979).
37. Powers of Attorneys General, supra note 6, at 33-36 & 172 (1977).
38. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 18 ME L.
REV. 155 (1966); see also Weinstein & Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Govern-
ment Attorneys and Clients, I Touno L. REV. 1, 26 & n.126 (1985).
39. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 18 ME L.
REV. 155, 168-72 (1966).
40. Id. at 171.
(Vol. 29
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with an attorney on the other side" that he did not object when
the Republican controlled county legislature extensively used counsel
other than Weinstein, an appointee of a Democratic county executive.
The legislature's use of independent counsel, Weinstein noted, "elimi-
nated many of the possible conflicts of interest and ethical problems
that otherwise would have proven most troublesome."'"
Another commentator, again without citing rules of ethics, ap-
plied the notions of loyalty and independent judgment underlying the
canons of legal ethics. The Honorable Robert L. Stem, Acting Solici-
tor General under President Truman and co-author of the leading
treatise on Supreme Court practice,42 considered "whether efficient
and orderly management of the Government's law business would...
eliminate the presentation of conflicting positions to the courts. '4 3 He
acknowledged that such a result was not actually possible in many
instances because Congress has given certain agencies separate and in-
dependent authority to present their positions to the court. Stern went
on to observe that even where centralized control existed:
the most orderly course may not always be the most wise. Many of
the administrative agencies are important policy-making bodies.
Not even the President has authority to tell them how to decide
particular cases. They are not subject to the supervisory authority
of the Department of Justice. Whatever control it has over them is
derived entirely from its right to decide what position should be
taken in the courts, particularly in the Supreme Court.44
Stern suggested that as a matter of general policy the Justice Depart-
ment permit agencies with which it disagrees to present their positions
in court. 5
One commentator who did apply legal ethics to governmental
41. Id. See also similar comments of a municipal attorney quoted in Note, Indiana City
Attorneys: A Conflict of Interests, 51 IND. L.J. 783 (1976). In "discussing a conflict between a
city board and the city administration," the municipal attorney said that "[s]hould this matter
continue, the board will have to hire its own attorney to sue the city. This staff cannot possibly
sue the administration it represents." Id. at 788.
42. R.L. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (5th ed. 1978).
43. Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 759, 768 (1951).
44. Id. at 768.
45. He concluded that "the Attorney General has no authority to give binding legal advice
to the independent agencies. Only the judiciary has authority to give the conclusive answer to
the question in dispute." Id. at 769. Stern also notes that the Justice Department's refusal to
take an agency's position, even where the agency has statutory authority to present its own posi-
tion, will often dissuade agencies from presenting their view because they feel the Supreme
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conflicts examined the role of city attorneys in Indiana. 4 6 She re-
viewed ambiguous statutes governing whether the city attorney should
represent both the mayor and common council. She observed that an
interpretation holding that the city attorney must represent both ran
afoul of legal ethics. She suggested that "[a]ssigning [the city attor-
ney] a role as representative of the city executive would be far more
consistent with the realities of Indiana municipal government, and
would free the attorney from the dilemmas posed by his present am-
biguous posture."".
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST APPROACH TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES
Government lawyers have often disregarded both the letter and
the spirit of the conflict rules. In so doing, they have relied on statu-
"Court will not look very favorably on arguments which the Government's chief law-enforce-
ment officer is unwilling to espouse." Id.
The question of the binding effect of opinions of public officer lawyers is beyond the scope of
this article. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the "binding force of opinions of the Attorney
General within the administration is still a controversial question." Nealon, The Opinion Func-
tion of the Federal Attorney General, 25 NY.U.L. REV. 825, 839 (1950).
Stem's view is supported by President Buchanan's Attorney General, Jeremiah Black, 9 Op.
U.S. Atty' Gen. 32 (1857), and opposed by President Monroe's Attorney General, William Wirt,
see Nealon, supra at 839 n. 70; see also 20 Op. U.S. Atty Gen. 722 (1884). Such Supreme Court
authority as there is appears unclear and divided. Compare S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 406 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) with Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388 (1918).
President Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell suggested that an Executive order on the
subject was required. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Litigator or
One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1068 (1978), and President Carter, like Presi-
dents Wilson and Rooselvelt, signed one. It was applicable only to presidential appointees antici-
pating litigation. Exec. Order No. 12146, 3 C.F.R. 411 at § 1-402 (1979). Implicit is the position
that the public officer lawyer's opinion is binding only when the highest executive authority
decides it should be followed by his appointees, i.e. not binding as a matter of law but of policy.
If New York is an example, state and local authorities are similarly divided. Compare City
of New York v. State, 61 Misc. 2d 517, 534, 306 N.Y.S. 2d 131, 147 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1969), afj'd, 49
A.D. 2d 644, 373 N.Y.S. 2d 853 (3d Dep't 1975), modified, 40 N.Y. 2d 651, 357 N.E. 2d 988, 389
N.Y.S. 2d (1976), on remand, 95 Misc. 2d 810, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 702 (1978) (State Attorney Gen-
eral opinion not determination judicially reviewable); In re City of New York (Beame), N.Y.L.J.,
August 3, 1970, p. 2, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd on other grounds, 37 A.D. 2d 89, 322
N.Y.S. 2d 503 (1st Dep't 1971); Slevin v. Siegel, 65 Misc. 2d 3, 4-5, 316 N.Y.S. 2d 809, 811-12
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970) with City of New York v. Buckley, 260 App. Div. 19, 28, 20
N.Y.S. 2d 289, 296 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 797,35 N.E. 2d 192 (1940); City of New York v.
Teachers Retirement System, 116 Misc. 2d 496, 455 N.Y.S. 2d 703 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982);
Redner v. City of New York, 53 Misc. 2d 148, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 51 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1967);
Correspondence Between the Finance and Law Departments upon the Question of their Rela-
tions and Duties in Matters of Law at 1-2 18 76 (on file N.Y.C. Municipal Reference Library).
46. Note, Indiana City Attorneys: A Conflict of Interests, 51 IND. L.J. 783 (1976).
47. Id. at 794.
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tory construction or the notion that the government lawyer represents
the people or both.
A. Statutory Construction
A number of statutes and state constitutions authorize govern-
ment lawyers or law agencies to conduct all the law of business of the
city, state or federal government.4" These statutes do not expressly
displace or otherwise mention the ethical rules applicable to attorneys.
However, a number of government attorneys have asserted that such
statutes authorize government attorneys to avoid conflict rules.4 9 They
argue that the government lawyer's authority to conduct all law busi-
48. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1982) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct
of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General"); N.Y. Executive Law § 63 ("The attorney-general shall:
1. Prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which the state is interested, and have
charge and control of all the legal business of the departments and bureaus of the state, or of any
office thereof which requires the services of attorney or counsel, in order to protect the interest of
the state..."); Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (Anderson 1983) ("The attorney general is the
chief law officer for the state.... No state officer, board, or the head of a department or institu-
tion of the state shall employ, or be represented by, other counsel or attorneys at law. The
attorney general shall appear for the state in the trial and argument of all civil and criminal
causes in the supreme court in which the state is directly or indirectly interested"); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 2504 (Supp. 1986) ("the Attorney General shall ... provide legal advice, counsel
and services for administrative offices, agencies, departments, boards, commissions and officers of
the state government concerning any matter arising in connection with the exercising of their
official powers or duties [and shall] represent as counsel in all proceedings or actions which may
be brought on behalf of or against them in their official capacity in any court, except in actions in
which the State has a conflicting interest, all officers, agencies, departments, boards, commissions
and instrumentalities of state government"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-125 (West Supp.
1987) ("The attorney general shall have general supervision over all legal matters in which the
state is an interested party, except those legal matters over which prosecuting officers have direc-
tion. He shall appear for the s tate, the governor, the lieutenant governor, the secretary, the
treasurer and the comptroller, and for all heads of departments and state boards ... in all suits
and other civil proceedings ... and all such suits shall be conducted by him or under his direc-
tion); Va. Code § 2.1-121 (1950) ("All legal service in civil matters for the Commonwealth, the
Governor and every State department, institution, division, commission, board, bureau, agency,
entity, official, justice of the Supreme Court or judge of any circuit court or district court, includ-
ing the conduct of all civil litigation in which any of them are interested, shall be rendered and
performed by the Attorney General, except as hereinafter provided . . ."); N.Y. City Charter
§ 394 ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or other law, the corporation counsel shall
be attorney and counsel for the city and every agency thereof and shall have charge and conduct
of all the law business of the city and its agencies and in which the city is interested"). Some
statutes provide for the appointment of independent counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 59 1(c) (1982); 2 ORE.
REV. STAT. § 180.235 (1985).
49. See infra notes 51-110 and accompanying text.
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ness permits her5° to represent differing interests and even to resolve
differing agency policy views when based upon 'differing legal
policies.5 '
An example of where a court, on statutory grounds, condoned
representation of conflicting interests between a mayor and a separate
governmental entity is Kay v. Board of Higher Education.52 The Kay
controversy arose in 1940 when the Board of Higher Education of the
City of New York appointed the world-renowned philosopher and
mathematician, Dr. Bertrand Russell, to a chair at The City College.
Church groups and fraternal organizations mounted a campaign
against the appointment because of Russell's support for heterosexual
sexual freedom and tolerance of homosexuality. The Protestant Epis-
copal Bishop of New York, Bishop Manning, was especially vigorous
in denouncing Russell, and publications such as the Jesuit America
passionately condemned the philosopher. 3 America termed Russell a
"desiccated, divorced, and decadent advocate of sexual promis-
cuity .... -4
On March 18, 1940, a taxpayer, Jean Kay, applied for an order
revoking Dr. Russell's appointment on the grounds that (1) Russell
was not a citizen as required by the Education Law, (2) there had been
no competitive examination for his position as required by the New
York Constitution, and (3) Russell's appointment violated public pol-
icy because of his immoral teachings and character. 5"
The New York City Corporation Counsel, serving by appoint-
ment and at the discretion of the Mayor and apparently representing
his views, appeared on behalf of the Board of Higher Education but
challenged only the petitioner's contention that the Education Law
50. In the absence of a neuter case in English, we will use the female pronouns "she" and
"her" as gender-neutral pronouns.
51. See, e-g., In re Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 99 N.M. 1,
653 P.2d 501 (1985) (permitting Attorney General to represent two separate parties); Bullock v.
Texas Skating Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 888 (Texas Civ. App. 1979) (permitting Attorney General to
appeal despite contrary instruction of state official). See also notes 92-106 and accompanying
text.
52. Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 260 App. Div. 9, 12, 20 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (1st Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 284 N.Y. 578, 29 N.E.2d 657, dismissing appeal from 173 Misc. 943, 18
N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940).
53. Note, The Bertrand Russell Litigation, 8 U. Cmi. L. REV. 316, 317 n.2 (1940); R.
CLARK, THE LiFE OF BERTRAND RUSSELL, 430, 470-471 (1976).
54. R. CLARK, THE LIFE OF BERTRAND RUSSELL supra note 53, at 470.
55. Kay, 173 Misc, at 943-945, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 823-824.
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required a teacher at an institution of higher education to be a citi-
zen.56 All three of petitioner's grounds were challenged by organiza-
tions appearing amici curiae. Special Term ruled in favor of the
taxpayer on all three issues presented. 7 Three weeks later, Mayor Fi-
orello A. LaGuardia had the appropriation for Dr. Russell's position
removed from the City budget.5"
After the Special Term decision, the Board wrote the Corporation
Counsel to inform him that it wished to appeal.59 The Corporation
Counsel advised that he thought the Board should not appeal,6' be-
cause, among other things, the Corporation Counsel believed that the
Board's appointment of Russell was ineffective as a result of the
Mayor's removal of the appropriation for the appointment from the
budget. 6 The Board insisted that it wanted to appeal, and the Corpo-
ration Counsel refused.62 The Board asked the Corporation Counsel's
appointing officer, the Mayor, to "supersede the Corporation Counsel
by designating special counsel to take an appeal."63 The Mayor re-
fused on grounds that the:
Corporation Counsel made the position of the City perfectly clear
and that is that he did not think it prudent or to the best interest of
the City to appeal this particular case in order not to make bad law
out of a hard case. 6'
The Board, which was and is a separate body corporate consid-
ered for some purposes a City agency and for others a State agency,65
then retained two distinguished members of the New York bar, Emory
R. Buckner, a former United States Attorney, and John M. Harlan,
later a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Harlan and Buck-
56. Id. at 944, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
57. Id. at 945, 953, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 824, 831.
58. Note, The Bertrand Russell Case: The History of a Litigation, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1192,
1194 n. 16 (1940); Note, The Bertrand Russell Litigation, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 317 n.2 (1940).
59. Brief for Respondent by its Corporation Counsel in Opposition to the Appearance of
Messrs. Buckner and Harlan in This Proceeding filed with the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment (dated June 3, 1940).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id.
65. Compare Hirschfield v. Cook, 227 N.Y. 297, 125 N.E. 504 (1919) (city agency) with
Ackley v. Board of Educ., 174 App. Div. 44, 159 N.Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dep't 1916) (state agency)
and Kelly v. Board of Educ., 141 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955) (same).
1986]
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ner, on behalf of the Board, moved for an order substituting private
attorneys for the Corporation Counsel, and, on behalf of twelve indi-
vidual members of the Board, moved for an order permitting them to
intervene individually. The petitioner and the Corporation Counsel
opposed the motions.6 6 Special Term agreed and denied both mo-
tions.67 The Board, through its independent counsel, sought to appeal
Special Term's rulings revoking Russell's appointment, denying ap-
pointment of independent counsel and denying intervention. The Cor-
poration Counsel, who opposed the appeal and the appearances of
Harlan and Buckner, asked the Appellate Division to dismiss the
Board's appeal.
The Appellate Division noted that under the language of the City
Charter providing the Corporation Counsel with the authority to con-
duct the law business of the City and its agencies, "the corporation
counsel is the sole judge as to the conduct of litigation and other law
matters... -"68 The court found, inter alia, that "the decision of the
corporation counsel with respect to the advisability of appealing from
the order setting aside the appointment of Russell is binding."69
Obviously, the Russell case inflamed the passions of the day.7 °
Even so, the Appellate Division result is difficult if not impossible to
square with its rationale. The court acknowledged that if there was
any allegation of "fraud, collusion or corruption" on the part of the
Corporation Counsel, or the presence of "conflicting interests" or
other grounds for disqualification, the result might be different.7 The
court, however, completely ignored the Corporation Counsel's conflict
between the interests of the Board of Higher Education and those of
his Mayor, who sought to prevent Russell's appointment,72 who had
appointed the Corporate-Counsel, and at whose pleasure the Corpora-
tion Counsel served. Perhaps the result is explicable because the
66. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59, at 8. See also 260 App. Div. at 10, 20 N.Y.S.2d at
895-99.
67. Id.
68. Kay, 260 App. Div. at 12, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 900; N.Y. City Charter §§ 394 & 395.
69. Kay 260 App. Div. at 12, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
70. See p. 550 supra; Compare Note, The Bertrand Russell Case: The History of a Litiga-
tion, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1192 (1940) and Hamilton, Trial By Ordeal, New Style, 50 YALE L.J.
778 (1941) with Kennedy & White, The Bertrand Russell Case Again, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 196
(1941) and Recent Decisions, 15 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 118 (1940).
71. Kay, 260 App. Div. at 12, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
72. Brief for Respondent, supra note 59 at 6-9.
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Mayor appointed the members of the Board of Education," and the
City did and does appropriate all its funds.74 Arguably, the Mayor
could as a matter of policy resolve a dispute between the Board and
the Corporation Counsel.
B. The People as Client
Many government lawyers have suggested that the public is the
true client of the government lawyer." For example, former Attorney
General Griffin Bell observed that, "[a]lthough our client is the gov-
ernment, in the end we serve a more important constituency: the
American people."76 The Professional Ethics Committee of The Fed-
eral Bar Association, which was chaired by Judge and former Solicitor
General Charles Fahy, and which included numerous prominent
members of the bench and bar,77 found that:
the government lawyer assumes a public trust, for the government,
over-all and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our
democracy with its representative form of government. Each part
of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the public
interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent with the
Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations. In contrast,
the private practitioner represents the client's personal or private
73. 1917 N.Y. Laws ch. 786 §§ 1 & 2 (repealed 1969).
74. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-i and its predessor laws.
75. This does not appear to be the majority view. Seventeen state attorneys general re-
sponded to a 1976 questionnaire. Nine said they viewed their role primarily as representing the
agencies of state government. Only four said they represented the interest of the people. Four
reported that they represented some combination of these. Apparently three of the first four
were elected attorney general, because the report notes that "interestingly" one of the four was
an appointed attorney general. Powers of Attorneys General, supra note 6, at 33-4. At least one
highly respected justice and scholar has suggested that the distinction between elected and ap-
pointed attorneys general in this context is without consequence. Secretary v. Attorney Gen.,
367 Mass. 154, 167, 326 N.E.2d 334, 341 (Kaplan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, an elected gov-
ernment lawyer may be more autonomous than an appointed one. A government lawyer ap-
pointed for a term may be in between. In the case of an elected government lawyer or one
appointed for a term, the officer or body in whom any power to remove the government lawyer is
lodged may also be relevant.
76. Bell, The Attorney-General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litiga-
tor, or one Among Many?, 46 FORDIIAM L. REV. 1049, 1069 (1978).
77. The Committee also included: Judge Arlin M. Adams, United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit; Superior Court Judge Sylvia Bacon, District of Columbia; Judge Earl
Chudoff of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia; Justin Dingfelder, Esq., Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, Federal Trade Commission; Axel Kleiboemer, Esq., Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, D.C.; Joseph G. O'Neill, Jr., Esq., Assistant Legislative Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency; The Honorable Harold E. Stassen, Philadelphia; Major Charles A. White, Jr., Judge
Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville.
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interest. 78
This special responsibility of the government lawyer can be
broadly construed to permit and indeed require the government law-
yer only to represent government officials who are acting in accord
with what she views as the public interest.79 Some have accordingly
analogized the government lawyer's task to the holding of the
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Young."0 The Supreme Court there held
that a citizen of another state could sue the Attorney General of
Minnesota:
[i]f the act which the State Attorney-General seeks to enforce be a
violation of the federal constitution, the officer, proceeding under
such enactment comes into conflict with a superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official represen-
tative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct."
The government lawyer following this approach must determine
whether the public official is acting in accord with the law and only
obey or represent public officials who are.82
Such ideas almost always arise not in a conflict situation but with
78. The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973).
79. In the words of the American Bar Association Report, The Survey of the Legal Profes-
sion, "To Inspire Confidence, It Is Required That Public Legal Positions Shall Be Conducted
And Opinions Rendered According To Law And Not To Please Politicians," quoted in
Seasongood, Public Service By Lawyers in Local Government, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 210, 222
(1951).
80. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1907). See discussions in Lawry, Who Is the
Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37 FED. B.J. 61,
64 (1978); Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC. Ass'n Bar City N.Y.
649, 650 (1977). This view holds that the government attorney pledges allegiance solely to the
law and public officials and agencies who act in accord with the law in the public interest.
81. Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
82. Opinion 73-1 of the Federal Bar Association Ethics Committee also deals with this
question. It states that where a government lawyer "who is designated to represent another in
government service against whom proceedings are brought of a disciplinary, administrative or
personnel character, including a court martial..., [t]he person the lawyer is designated to repre-
sent is the client." In regard to other government lawyers, the opinion notes that:
the client of the federally employed lawyer, using the term in the sense of where lies his
immediate professional obligation and responsibility, is the agency where he is em-
ployed, including those charged with its administration insofar as they are engaged in
the conduct of the public business.
32 FED. B.J. at 72. Thus, so long as the agency is acting in the public interest, the client is the
agency and its employees. If the official behaves in a manner which is either illegal or perhaps
merely inconsistent with the public interests entrusted with his agency, the government lawyer is
free to disregard the lawyer-client relationship with that official. See Weinstein & Crosthwait,
Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys and Clients, I TOURO L. REV. 1
(1985).
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regard to wrongdoing by a public official. "Where the client is the
Government itself," Judge Fahy noted, "he who represents this vague
entity often becomes its conscience, bearing a heavier responsibility
than usually encountered by the lawyer."83 Similarly, Chief Judge
Weinstein, commenting on his service as Nassau County Attorney,
noted that "[g]ovemments and their attorneys have a duty to help in-
dividuals and to try to build a better society."84 He suggested that
"[i]f there is wrongdoing in government, it must be exposed. The law
officer has a special obligation not to permit a cover-up of illegal activ-
ity on the ground that exposure may hurt his party."
85
Even though the people-as-client notion most often arises in the
context of wrongdoing, it has been applied to conflicts. A government
lawyer who represents the people has only one client and need not
worry about conflicts between sources of governmental authority. Af-
ter all, when buyer and seller are both the people, how can there be a
conflict of interests? This was apparently the viewpoint of the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General when it recently attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade the American Bar Association to exempt
government attorneys from conflict of interest rules generally gov-
erning attorneys. 86
83. Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331, 335
(1974).
84. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 18 ME. L.
REV. 155, 158 (1966).
85. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
86. Letter dated June 1, 1984 from Peggy Ann Ross, Esq., Assistant Ethics Counsel, Amer-
ican Bar Association, to Mr. William Kava, Research Assistant, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson and enclosure. During recent deliberations regarding the Model Rules, the National
Association of Attorneys General sought to amend the following rules to add the phrase "THIS
RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SER VICE, ACTING PURSU-
ANT THERETO:"
RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION
RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE
RULE 1.8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS
RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT
RULE 1.10 IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE
RULE 1.12 (b)(cXd) FORMER JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR
RULE 1.13 ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT
RULE 1.16 (a)(3) DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION
RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY
RULE 2.3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS
RULE 3.7 (b) LAWYER AS WITNESS
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A leading commentator has also rejected attempts "to force gov-
ernment conflict-of-interest issues into a determination of which 'cli-
ents' should command the special loyalty of the government
lawyer.""7 That commentator concluded that "the priorities that a
lawyer should attach to each of his responsibilities to various govern-
ment entities depends, not on some vague and misleading notion about
the identity of his 'real' client, but rather on how his performance of
these responsibilities will affect the obligation of the government to
serve the public interest.""8
This view has been eloquently applied to the role of the Solicitor
General by former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold:
The Solicitor General's client in a particular case cannot be prop-
erly represented before the Supreme Court except from a broad
point of view, taking into account all of the factors which affect
sound government and the proper formulation and development of
the law. In providing for the Solicitor General, subject to the direc-
tion of the Attorney General, to attend to the "interests of the
United States" in litigation, the statutes have always been under-
stood to mean the long-range interests of the United States, not sim-
ply in terms of its fisc, or its success in the particular litigation, but
as a government, as a people.89
RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL
RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR
SUPERVISORY LAWYER
RULE 5.4 (b) PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER
RULE 5.5 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE
RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS
RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION
RULE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT
INTERESTS
RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER'S
SERVICES
RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING
RULE 7.3 PERSONAL CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE
RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS
RULE 8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS
This attempt was rejected by both the Committee drafting the rules and the American Bar Asso-
ciation as a whole. Id.
87. Developments, supra note 7, at 1414 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 1415 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
89. Quoted in 46 FORDHAM L. REV. at 1060. See also former Solicitor and Attorney Gen-
eral Francis Biddle's description of the Office of the Solicitor General:
The work combines the best of private practice and of government service. He deter-
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Alabama Attorney General, William J. Baxley, unequivocally ap-
plied the public interest approach to conflict situations. He noted that
"because a governmental entity derives its legitimacy from the public,
or the people, when the public's interest is in conflict with that of the
governmental entity, the state's attorney is obligated to represent the
public."9 Baxley argues that the state's attorney should be "a buffer
between the citizen and his government and whose ultimate allegiance
is to the people at large."'"
There also exists judicial support for the public interest approach
to conflicts. In Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecti-
cut Freedom of Information Comm'n,92 the court specifically rejected
the application of legal ethics rules to the Attorney General. The At-
torney General's office represented both the Commission on Special
Revenue ("CSR") and the Freedom of Information Commission
("FOIC"). A private party defendant sought disqualification of the
Attorney General, and the trial court agreed. On appeal, the Connect-
icut Supreme Court reversed. It expressly found that the conflict rules
of legal ethics did not prevent the Attorney General's office from rep-
resenting opposing interests.93 The Court noted that "the real client of
the Attorney General is the people of the state."94 The court accord-
ingly concluded that, "[w]here he or she is not an actual party, the
Attorney General may represent opposing State agencies in a
mines what cases to appeal, and the client has no say in the matter. He does what his
lawyer tells him. The lawyer stands in his client's shoes, for the client is but an abstrac-
tion. He is responsible neither to the man who appointed him nor to his immediate
superior in the hierarchy of administration. The total responsibility is his, and his
guide is only the ethic of his own profession framed in the ambience of his experience
and judgment. And he represents the most powerful client in the world. . . The
Solicitor General has no master to serve except his country.
F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97-98 (1962); Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme
Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1444 n. I (1969). But see supra
notes 39 & 43 and accompanying text (where Attorney General permitted separate representa-
tion) and Stern, supra note 43. Indeed, the United States has sued a United States agency. See,
e.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall. 370, 371 (U.S. 1866).
See Hart & Wechsler, 1315, 1316 & n.1, 1318-19 (2d ed. Bator et al. 1973). A state agency has
sued another state agency. See, e.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. New York State, 90 A.D.2d
51, 456 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1982).
90. Baxley, The State's Attorney, 25 ALA. L. REV. 19, 20 (1972).
91. Id. at 21.
92. Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Information
Comm'n, 174 Conn. 308, 387 A.2d 533 (1978).
93. Id. at 537.
94. Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
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dispute."9'
The notion that a government attorney is a lawyer representing a
client was also rejected in Feeney v. Commissioner.96 The State of
Massachusetts and a number of state agencies, represented by the At-
torney General, were defendants in a case where plaintiff sought to
void the preference for veterans in public employment. The plaintiff
won in United States District Court, and the Governor of the State, as
well as the other defendants, decided not to appeal. 97 Notwithstand-
ing their position, the Attorney General filed a jurisdictional statement
with the United States Supreme Court. When the defendants dis-
avowed the jurisdictional statement, the Supreme Court certified to
the Massachusetts Supreme Court the question of whether the Attor-
ney General was authorized to appeal.9 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court found that the Attorney General could appeal based on his au-
thority to represent the public interest.99 The court concluded that:
The authority of the Attorney General, as chief law officer, to as-
sume primary control over the conduct of litigation which involves
the interests of the Commonwealth has the concommitant effect of
creating a relationship with the state officers he represents that is
not constrained by the parameters of the traditional attorney-client
relationship. "
In Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton," ! as well, the court
applied the public interest approach to a conflict situation. In holding
that the elected state attorney general, who was assigned by statute to
represent the agencies and officers of the state, did not lack the author-
ity to challenge the promulgation or enforcement of allegedly uncon-
stitutional laws by those agencies and officers,'0 2 the court observed
95. Id. at 537. State ex rel Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss.
1979) (permitting Attorney General to challenge action of state agency where his office also
represented that agency). See also In re Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 99 N.M. 1, -, 653 P.2d 501, 505 (1985) (on statutory and constitutional grounds,
court permits Attorney General to represent both state agencies and customers in action). But
see People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. 478, 481, 624 P.2d 1206, 1209 (1981).
96. Feeney v. Commissioner, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977).
97. Id. at 360-62, 366 N.E.2d 1263-1264.
98. Id. at 362-67, 366 N.E.2d 12641265.
99. Id. at 366, 366 N.E.2d 1266-1267. See Secretary of Admin. and Fin. v. Attorney Gen.,
367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334 (1975).
100. Feenney, 373 Mass. at 359, 366 N.E.2d at 1266.
101. Commonwealth ex reL Hancock v. Paxtun, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974).
102. Id.
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that "in case of a conflict of duties the Attorney General's primary
obligation is to the Commonwealth, the body politic, rather than to its
officers, departments, commissions or agencies."1 ' The court did not,
however, deny independent representation to the state department of
transportation which was challenging the Attorney General's
authority.
The insurance superintendent of Illinois was, however, denied in-
dependent representation in Fergus v. Russel, 4 where the court found
that:
the Attorney General is the chief law officer of the State, and the
only officer empowered to represent the people in any suit or pro-
ceeding in which the State is the real party in interest except where
the constitution or a constitutional statute may provide
otherwise. '0 5
Other courts have similarly used a public interest approach to
disregard conflicts for government lawyers. 106 In most of these cases
the court did not explicitly cite the ethical rules and discuss the ethical
issues as such.
A government lawyer has mixed the people as client argument
with the statutory construction argument. In a recent article, Freder-
ick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel of The City of New
York,"0 7 asks the question, "What happens if two agencies differ in
their views, or if one independently elected official disagrees with an-
other?" 108 Schwarz suggests that the government lawyer should an-
swer this question by looking to the public interest. "While the
president of a corporation is obligated to act in the interests of his
shareholders, not in the interests of his competitors," Schwarz ob-
serves, "an elected or appointed government official has a duty to con-
103. Id. at 868.
104. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
105. Id. at 145.
106. State ex rel. Morrison v. Thomas, 297 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 1956) (permitting Attorney Gen-
eral to prosecute appeal not authorized by agency); Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollu-
tion Control Board, 372 N.E.2d 50 (I11. 977) (denying Pollution Control Board private counsel
and finding no impermissible conflict where Attorney General had at times represented both
parties, represented the Agency, and refused to represent the Board in appellate court); State
Health Planning and Coordinating Council v. Hyland, 161 N.J. Super. 468, 391 A.2d 1247 (App.
Div. 1978) (permitting Attorney General to deny representation to plaintiff agency).
107. F.A.Q. Schwarz, Jr., Lawyers for Government Face Unique Problems, N.Y.L.J. 1 (May
1, 1984).
108. Id. at p. 38.
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sider the interests of all his constituents, not just those of the majority
that elected him."' 9 Schwarz suggests further that the New York
City Charter provisions declaring that the Corporation Counsel repre-
sents the "City" and the "people" were intended to reinforce this
notion. 1 0
III. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE
ETHICAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES
The public interest approach should be rejected as a matter of
construction and of policy. Only the ethical approach permits a public
officer lawyer to function as a lawyer. Most important, only the ethi-
cal approach is consistent with our pluralistic systems of government.
A. There is No Statutory Basis for the Public Interest Approach
Many statutes authorize a government lawyer generally to con-
duct a government law business.1 1 But we have found no such statute
which expressly displaces the rules of legal ethics. Nor have we found
any evidence that any such statute was intended to displace the ethical
rules in general or their conflict rules in particular. The ethical rules
109. Id. (emphasis in original).
110. The provision that logically follows, representing both sides in a case, has drawn ajudi-
cial rebuke.
In Matter of Randy G, 127 Misc. 2d 1079, 1083-84, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 967, 971 (Family Ct.
Kings County 1985), the Corporation Counsel appeared for both the presentment agency and the
respondent. In dismissing the presentment agency's position the court said:
The presentment agency must therefore remain independent and objective during
every stage of the proceeding. The interests of the court clinic should not be the con-
cern of the presentment agency. As this court stated earlier in this decision, in order to
more effectively cross-examine the preparer of a mental health study at the disposi-
tional hearing, the attorney appearing on behalf of the presentment agency might have
wished to be present with the Law Guardian at the evaluation interview. He might
wish to disagree with the conclusions reached by the clinic at the dispositional hearing.
By choosing to appear both as the attorney representing the clinic and the presentmen;
agency the Corporation Counsel has needlessly created a conflict which undermines the
performance of its primary duty in this proceeding.
Since only the Corporation Counsel may act as presentment agency (Family Ct
Act § 254), the court cannot disqualify that agency and assign another attorney to
appear in their place. Therefore, in view of the fact that this court considers the abdica-
tion by the presentment agency of its proper role as serious misconduct, and also takes
into consideration the nature of the finding in this matter (an attempt to take money
and tokens from a token booth) and the fact that at the time the finding was made this
respondent was before the Supreme Court in another matter for which he was subse-
quently sentenced, it is ordered that this proceeding be and is hereby dismissed in fur-
therance of justice pursuant to Family Court Act § 315.2(l)(c). (emphasis added)
11. See supra note 48.
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generally have the force of law,' " 2 and the statutes on government law
business should therefore be read consistent with the rules of legal eth-
ics.' 13 As many courts and bar association committees have found,
statutes which state generally that a government lawyer will represent
a set of officials and agencies do not provide authority for disregarding
legal ethics." 4 A legislature could, of course, expressly provide to the
contrary, but we know of no such statute. For a legislature to make
such a provision, as discussed below, would undermine the adequate
legal representation of independent public officers and also the plural-
istic and representative basis of our government.
B. Only the Ethical Approach is Consistent with Adequate Legal
Representation
Lawyers, including government lawyers, are under an ethical ob-
ligation to follow the client's instructions when acting in a representa-
tive capacity. The comment to Rule 1.2 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct states that, "The client has the ultimate author-
ity to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation,
within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obliga-
tions." Ethical Consideration 7-7 of the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility says that other than "[i]n certain areas of legal
representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially
prejudicing the right of a client, . . . the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the
law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer."
The interrelationship between these ethical rules and those princi-
ples discussed above requiring separate legal representation where
there are separate client interests is plain. Under the ethical approach,
each type of government lawyer has a client to whom to be responsible
112. For example, the New York State citations are N.Y. Judiciary L. § 90 subd. 2 & app.;
1st Dep't App. Div. R. § 603.2, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.2; 2 Dep't App. Div. R. § 691.1, 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 691.1; 3d Dep't App. Div. R. § 806.2, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 806.2; 4th Dep't App.
Div. R. 1022.17, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1022.17. See Lowler v. Mayor of New York, 5 Abb. Pr. 325,
337 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dist. Spec. Term), modified on other grounds, 26 Barb. 262 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1857) ("Although subject, within certain limits to the legally authorized resolutions of the Com-
mon Council, when acting in his general character of 'counsel to the corporation'; when acting as
an attorney of the court he is subject to the rules and regulations of the court").
113. The court in Krahmer v. McClafferty, 282 A.2d 631, 632 (Del. Super. 1971), went even
further. For more detailed discussion see supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
114. See supra notes 17-37.
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where a conflict exists. The appointed government lawyer serving at
the pleasure of a particular official represents that official. The govern-
ment lawyer appointed or elected for a term serves at the pleasure of
no one. If not disqualified entirely, perhaps subject only to the public
officer or agency in whom any power to remove that lawyer may be
lodged, she could choose her client in the event of a conflict.
Disregarding the ethical approach leaves the government lawyer
without a client where government authorities conflict."1 5 Disregard-
ing the ethical approach may also leave the government client without
a lawyer. One commentator has noted, for example, that for a govern-
ment lawyer, the "public interest or community at large. .. is a vague
and meaningless abstraction. It is impossible to represent the commu-
nity which is always divided." '16 The government lawyer who uses
the public interest approach when policy colleagues are in conflict
usurps the function of the client to provide her with instructions. In-
evitably, the lawyer who decides for herself which conflicting point of
view to represent decides what the public interest is. Such a lawyer is
not a lawyer representing a client but a lawyer representing herself.
The public interest approach, moreover, actually forces a lawyer
into a situation of divided loyalties. The reasons for generally avoid-
ing divided loyalties have been described above. When there are in-
dependent sources of authority within the government, a further
personal conflict of interest for the government lawyer is created.1 17 It
will be in the government lawyer's personal interest to favor the inter-
115. The rules of legal ethics governing representation of organizations are not to the con-
trary. The Model Code provides that an attorney for the organization represents the organiza-
tion and not its officers. See Note, Indiana City Attorneys: A Conflict of Interests, 51 IND. L.J.
783, 792 (1976). Applied to government lawyers this concept might indeed suggest that the
client is the people or the government as a whole. But organizations have legal, not corporeal,
existence. It is axiomatic that they can act only through their boards, officers, or other agents.
For example, a city, state or federal agency subject to executive control is part of an organization
headed by the chief executive, and the rules for representation of an organization may well apply.
However, each independent source of governmental authority may be a separate client. Conflicts
between the chief executive and officers appointed for a term or who may be removed only for
cause may lead to an ethical requirement for separate representation. Separately and indepen-
dently elected public officers each are independent sources of authority to whom the organiza-
tional rules are not relevant. Conflicts between a board and its members, between a board and a
city or state or the federal government, conflicts between independent boards and commissions
and the chief executive are also not subject to the organizational rule.
116. Sale, The City Attorney's Relationship with Council and Staff: Determining Who is the
Client in Day-to-Day Affairs, 11 CURRENT MUN. PROaS. 10, 11 (1984).
117. See Note, Indiana City Attorneys A Conflict of Interests, 51 IND. L.J. 783, 790-794
(1976).
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est of the government officer by whom she is appointed or from whom
she may expect advancement or other benefit, even if the other public
officers have independent sources of power.
Adequate legal representation will not be provided under the pub-
lic interest approach. Public office or public agency clients are no less
and perhaps more deserving of adequate if not full legal representa-
tion. Denying that to them, as some courts have done,'18 serves only
the personal interest of the controlling government lawyer. Providing
for that government lawyer to represent both sides, as at least some
courts have done, 1 9 means affording less adequate representation to
conflicting public points of view than that to which conflicting private
points of view are entitled.
C. Only the Ethical Approach is Consistent With Pluralistic and
Representative Government
The requirement inherent in the public interest approach that the
government lawyer determine the public interest is counter to repre-
sentative democracy. Rarely are government lawyers elected, and
even then they are never the ultimate source of public authority even
concerning the law. A commentator has noted that "one of the princi-
pal purposes of [our] government is to provide a set of institutions that
analyze and define the public interest. No individual attorney can
hope to perform this task on his own."' 20 As Judge Bronson elo-
quently wrote in State ex rel Amerland v. Hagan:m " '
although it is perfectly obvious under the statute that the Attorney
General is the general and the legal adviser of the various offices of
the state government, and entitled to appear and represent them in
court, this does not mean that the Attorney General, standing in the
position of an attorney to a client, who happens to be an officer of
the government, steps into the shoes of such client in wholly di-
recting the defense and legal steps to be taken in opposition or con-
trary to the wishes and demands of his client or the officer or
118. See supra notes 51, 52, 94, 98, 106 and accompanying text.
119. See, supra notes 94, 95, 97 and accompanying text.
120. Developments, supra, note 7 at 1414; see Note, Indiana City Attorneys: A Conflict of
Interests, 51 IND. L.J. 783, 792 (1976) (noting that it is "unlikely that an attorney could accu-
rately predict the 'best interests' of the municipality").
121. State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372 (N.D. 1919).
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department concerned. 12
2
Obviously, the highest elected government official should gener-
ally be the highest policy dispute resolution authority, superior even as
to issues of law to the ranking government lawyer, especially if she
appoints that lawyer. In the United States, the government "derives
all its powers, indirectly or directly, from the great body of the people,
and is administered by persons holding their office during pleasure for
a limited period, or during good behavior."' t 23  In a republic, the au-
thority of the people is exercised by elected officials and by persons
appointed by those elected officials, not specially by lawyers.
The first duty of the government lawyer, when confronted by a
conflict among her government clients, is to refer the dispute to the
policy superior of both her clients for resolution. 24  When that gov-
ernment superior acts incorrectly, even when arguably acting illegally,
the government lawyer's choice should generally be between resigning
or being removed rather than being insubordinate. 125 The government
lawyer's choices raise more complicated issues when the public of-
ficer's conduct arguably warrants removal from office,' 2 6 when a pub-
lic officer is in conflict with an independent public officer or agency
127
122. Id. at 374.
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 251 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
124. Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 1977).
Justice Kaplan of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, a well-known scholar and jurist, has ob-
served that "[o]therwise matters of high importance to the State-or at least considered by the
chief executive to be so-might be finally decided not by the responsible operator but by the
lawyer. Secretary of Admin. and Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 361, Mass. 154, 167, 326 N.E.2d 334,
341 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
125. A General Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission has noted that "[i]f a
government attorney cannot ungrudgingly adhere to the ethical imperative requiring promotion
of the President's policies through legal advocacy, then he might voluntarily consider voluntary
resignation from Executive Branch." Fein, Promoting the President's Policies through Legal Ad-
vocacy, 30 FED. B.J. 408 (1983). But see Solicitor General, now Judge, Robert Bork, who agreed
to discharge Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox after his superiors in the Justice Department
refused to do so. Bork noted that he had decided not to resign "for the sake of 'continuity.'"
Bork Asserts He'd Press White House for Evidence, New York Times, Oct. 25, 1973, p. 1, col. 6.
126. When a public officer acts illegally so as to warrant removal, impeachment or prosecu-
tion, a government lawyer may have a duty to the public not just to resign or be removed but to
report this wrongdoing. This is not inconsistent with the ethical approach. The duty to act
arises because of wrongdoing and not because of conflict. See PUBLIc DUTIEs: THE MORAL
OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 75-6 (ed. J.L. Fleishman, L. Liebman & M.H.
Moore 1981). That the conflicts create difficulties for the government lawyer is manifest; Note,
Conflicts of Interests in Inspector General, Justice Department, and Special Prosecutor Investiga-
tion of Agency Heads, 35 STAN. L. REV. 975 (1983).
127. See, e.g., Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 1, 27 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1946) (rejecting attempt by
attorney general to enjoin retention of independent counsel); Saint v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 So.
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or when the government lawyer is elected or holds office for a term. 28
Democracies are deliberately not monolithic. This is particularly
true in the United States. On the federal level, there are the three
branches of government, and their many checks and balances. This
pattern is repeated with variations at the state and local levels. On
each level, independently elected officials, each with independent au-
thorization from the electorate, may and usually do have different
views or goals. 129 There also exist independent agencies which are not
directly or even indirectly answerable to one or more elected public
officers and might have different perspectives on the public interest.
Thus, in contrast to authoritarian forms of government, in a plu-
ralistic republic differing interests flourish. Conflicts of interests are
not only inevitable but desirable. The United States has adopted an
adversarial approach to the resolution of disputes. The basis for the
adversarial system is that independent presentation of the differing in-
terests will enable those who judge in our society to make better deci-
sions. When differing legal interests are concerned, that process can
only adequately occur when the different interests are competently
represented by independent counsel.' 3 The conflicts of interest rules
of legal ethics are consistent with this republican and pluralistic gov-
ernment. The public interest approach, in a conflicts context, is not.
The ethical approach ensures that differences between independ-
246 (La. 1931) (same); In re City of New York (Beame), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1970, p. 2, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County), affd on other grounds, 37 A.D.2d 89, 322 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1971)
(rejecting effort to enjoin Comptroller from acting on advice of private counsel contrary to that
of Corporation Counsel); Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1982)
(finding constitutional statutes which authorize agencies to retain independent counsel).
128. A public law officer elected or appointed and serving for a term may be viewed as hav-
ing been delegated some of the authority of the public or of the appointing officer.
129. See, e.g., In re City of New York (Beame), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1970, p. 2, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), afl'd on other grounds, 37 A.D.2d 89, 322 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1971); Note,
Indiana City Attorneys: A Conflict of Interests, 51 IND. L.J. 783 (1976) (passim).
130. Even the court which promulgated the rule of Feeney, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262
(1977), supra notes 96-99, permitting the Attorney General to appeal contrary to the wishes of
his clients, has held that where the Attorney General declines to represent a state entity, the
court should appoint independent counsel for that entity to be paid by public funds. Clerk of
Super. Ct. v. Treasurer, 386 Mass. 517, 437 N.E.2d 158, 163-164 (1982); Secretary of Admin. &
Finance v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 165 n.8, 326 N.E.2d 334, 339 n.8 (1975) (see also
dissenting opinion). Even the court which decided Commission on Special Revenue v. Connecti-
cut Freedom of Information Commission felt compelled there to construct a situation, obviously
inadequate, where one subordinate assistant attorney general represented one agency and another
subordinate assistant attorney general the other. 174 CONN. 308, 322, 387 A.2d 533, 538-39
(1978), discussed supra notes 92-95.
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ent sources of governmental authority are adequately heard and prop-
erly decided. With regard to the Bertrand Russell case discussed
above, a commentator suggested that the failure of the Board to obtain
adequate representation prevented full consideration of the significant
legal issues raised by the case. The commentator observed that "had
the litigation been conducted in the normal fashion the legal issues
involved might well have been otherwise determined."13 1
There are other advantages. Chief Judge Weinstein, as men-
tioned earlier, noted that while he was County Attorney, representing
a Democratic county executive, the Republican county legislature ob-
tained independent counsel. Weinstein observed that:
The fact that the Republican Board of Supervisors had an honora-
ble counsel, Harold Collins, one I could deal with on an adversarial
basis, eliminated many of the possible conflicts of interest and ethi-
cal problems that otherwise would have proven most troublesome.
Indeed, more often than not we assisted each other in moderating
our clients' positions so that they could, together, move forward in
the exciting and essential job of providing good local
government. 1
32
As Chief Judge Weinstein's anecdote indicates, the ethical approach is
preferable not only because it is consistent with democratic govern-
ance, but also because it offers concrete practical advantages.
The ethical approach has been espoused quite eloquently by John
Carlock, a 20-year veteran government lawyer. In discussing the the-
sis that "an agency lawyer had some inherent and compelling respon-
sibility, superior even to that of the agency head, to determine whether
various courses of action can or cannot be undertaken," he suggested
that:
The theory seemed to be that the lawyer, by virtue of having taken
the oath as a member of the bar, had acquired some duty--divine,
sovereign, or constitutional.... I cannot quite agree with this phi-
losophy, though I have found it widely and earnestly held. Cer-
tainly it is the agency lawyer's duty to make his views felt by the
agency head: for without that, his counseling becomes a cipher.
Certainly he must have ideals, for technique without ideals is dan-
131. Note, The Bertrand Russell Case: The History of a Litigation, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1192,
1194 (1940).
132. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Atorney, 18 ME. L.
REV. 155, 171 (1966).
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gerous. But I do not believe that the ritual of becoming a member
of the bar invests a government lawyer with a power of life and
death over the agency he serves. The agency head takes his own
oath of office, and he is also subject to the inscrutable forces of pub-
lic opinion. In carrying out his responsibility to decide policy, the
agency head looks to his lawyer's counseling as one of his strongest
supports, but the lawyer's counsel can never usurp the decision
which must be made by the responsible head of the agency.'
33
The public interest approach, in contrast, leads to a government of
lawyers, not of laws, a result as objectionable as a government of peo-
ple, not of law.
133. Corlock, The Lawyer in Government LISTEN TO LEADERS IN LAW 255, 268-269 (ed. A.
Love & J.S. Childers 1963).
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